Integrity & Observation
The Vote phase must be credible under adversarial conditions. This chapter defines the integrity safeguards and observation architecture required to make outcomes defensible.
Objectives
Prevent or deter coercion, fraud, and manipulation.
Provide independent evidence about process integrity.
Detect anomalies early enough to correct them.
Create a record that can withstand post-result contestation.
Integrity Threats (Baseline Assumptions)
Design should assume:
intimidation and retaliation threats against voters and officials,
administrative manipulation (selective exclusion, “missing” registrants),
disinformation and fabricated incident claims,
cyberattacks on registration, reporting, or tabulation systems,
physical disruption of polling and transport.
Observation Mission: Requirements
An observation mission must have:
1. Independence
Governance that prevents capture.
Funding and logistics that avoid single-party dependence.
2. Access
Freedom to visit polling sites, counting sites, and registration centers.
Ability to interview stakeholders without intimidation.
Access to key documents and procedures (within privacy limits).
3. Coverage and Sampling Plan
Deployment coverage targets (e.g., % of sites covered).
Statistically meaningful sampling where full coverage is impossible.
Explicit monitoring of high-risk areas and displaced voting sites.
4. Reporting Authority
Right to publish findings on a defined schedule.
Ability to flag urgent integrity concerns in real-time.
Transparent methodology disclosures (what was observed, how, and limitations).
5. Coordination with Security and Monitoring Systems
Channels to report threats and intimidation incidents.
Integration with Freeze monitoring when violence affects voting safety.
Anti-Coercion Package (Minimum)
A credible anti-coercion design includes:
Secret ballot protections (procedural and physical).
Safeguards against “supervised voting” by coercers.
Protections for election workers and observers.
Rapid response for intimidation claims (hotline + investigation).
Safe reporting mechanisms for vulnerable groups.
Rules for invalidating or re-running compromised precincts.
Track coercion with:
Complaint volume and category breakdown.
Geographic clustering of threats.
Incident severity and recurrence.
Correlation with turnout anomalies (as a flag).
Audit and Integrity Checks (Minimum)
Even with observers, you need auditability:
Chain-of-custody documentation for ballots/records.
Reconciliation checks (issued vs returned vs counted).
Risk-limiting audit or defined recount triggers.
Independent review of tabulation software (if used).
Logs that are tamper-evident and time-stamped (where feasible).
Transparency: What Should Be Published
Publish, at minimum:
Rulebook and procedures (version-locked).
Observer mission methodology and reports.
Aggregate participation and turnout statistics.
Incident and complaint summaries (privacy-protected).
Audit results and reconciliation summaries.
Final results with clear aggregation logic.
Keep restricted:
Personally identifiable voter data.
Information that increases physical security risk.
Sensitive cyber defense details.
(See Data Governance
Integration with Dispute Resolution
Integrity findings must have procedural consequences:
Observer flags can trigger investigations.
Defined thresholds trigger recounts or reruns.
Timelines are enforced to prevent indefinite contestation.
See: Dispute Resolution
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